

ORIGINAL ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS

Motivations and Views on State Support for Refugees: Distinguishing Between Politically and Socially Engaged

Sifka Etlar Frederiksen | Liam Haller | Theresa Uhr

German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM-Institut), Berlin, Germany

Correspondence: Sifka Etlar Frederiksen (frederiksen@dezim-institut.de)

Received: 5 February 2024 | **Revised:** 3 August 2024 | **Accepted:** 10 September 2024

Funding: These data collections were made possible through funding from the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend) in Germany as part of the project Ukraine-Engagement in Deutschland: Neue und alte Formen des Engagement für Geflüchtete.

Keywords: civil society | Germany | migration | migration regime | statistical modeling | survey | volunteering

ABSTRACT

This research investigates engagement for refugees within the German socio-political landscape. Following the arrival of one million forced migrants from Ukraine to Germany in 2022, we conducted two surveys on those who volunteered in support. The first was on general engagement ($N = 2000$) and the second was on individuals who provided homestay accommodation ($N = 3682$). Our analysis explores the driving motivations for different types of engagement, comparing individuals involved in political activities with those engaged in social-humanitarian activities. We find that value-based motivations impact both political and social-humanitarian engagement, with universalism driving political engagement and benevolence linked to social-humanitarian involvement. Further, differing motivations and types of engagement align with varying beliefs about the role of the state, suggesting that individuals engaged politically believe in increased state responsibility, contrasting with views held by socially engaged individuals. These findings are contextualized within the broader literature on engagement and migration regimes.

1 | Introduction

Civil society—comprising both established organizations and non-affiliated private citizens—plays a vital role in the reception process of people seeking asylum, particularly during acute phases. It undertakes tasks such as coordinating the arrival and integration of newly arrived asylum seekers, facilitating access to housing, recreational activities, education and the labour market and providing assistance with bureaucratic processes (Carlsen, Gårdhus, and Toubøl 2023; Weissner 2022; Simsa 2017; Harder et al. 2018) until state actors are in a position to respond (Schmid 2021, 209). The role of civil society, however, is not limited to social-humanitarian acts. Alongside work in social-humanitarian engagement, participants in civil society are also active in political

activities, such as joining demonstrations and composing critical articles or letters.

Following the arrival of refugees from Ukraine in Germany, widespread solidarity emerged across nearly all segments of society, with over half of the population willing to engage in refugee support or donate (Mayer et al. 2022). The intense media coverage of the Russian attack on Ukraine and the rapid arrival of refugees at central stations across Germany made the situation and the urgent needs of refugees highly visible. This heightened awareness likely contributed to the groundswell of support, including from those not previously involved in refugee engagement. Within a few months, Germany had received nearly one million forced migrants from Ukraine (Mediendienst

[Correction added on 18 October 2024, after first online publication: Acknowledgments section has been updated.]

This is an open access article under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

© 2024 The Author(s). *Global Networks* published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Integration 2023; Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2023), and the EU responded in part by activating the Temporary Protection Directive to ease their arrival. This directive significantly impacted both Ukrainian asylum seekers and engagement in the field by, among other outcomes, waiving residency requirements tied to asylum procedures for Ukrainians therefore permitting them to access either private or public housing options without delay. By reducing the structural barriers associated with integration bureaucracy (e.g., housing, work visas and matriculation), this change not only encouraged participation by minimizing hurdles for volunteers and deterrents such as negative media coverage but also enabled new forms of social-humanitarian engagement. Homestay accommodation, once a niche form of engagement, suddenly flourished as incoming refugees, no longer restricted to public accommodations, gained the legal right to register wherever they could secure housing. Further, given they were now able to establish a temporary residency outside the regular reception system, much help from civil society was needed to assist newcomers with bureaucracy and documents spurring more volunteers into action.

Previous comparable events, like the large-scale mobilization of new volunteers in 2015–2016, reveal that many participants perceive their involvement as non-political (Karakayali and Kleist 2016), whereas others are explicitly political (Schmid, Evers, and Mildener 2019). Despite operating within the same societal sphere, volunteers engage in diverse ways, ranging from political actions like protesting and petitioning to social-humanitarian activities more closely associated with the lives of those affected. Although it is well established that people engage based on various motivations—such as the desire to effect change or personal development—and that different catalysts like social networks, compelling media reports, disagreement with actions against refugees and direct contact with refugees can spur involvement (Landmann et al. 2023), less attention has been given to whether the motivations that compel these actions vary across different forms of engagement.

The expansion of homestay accommodation, including its increased use and early adoption, represents a significant shift where engagement surpasses the public sphere and enters the personal home spheres on a full-time basis of those engaged. This transition highlights the evolving roles of volunteers in refugee reception and invites a deeper exploration of the motivations behind such profound personal involvement, as well as how individuals perceive their contributions in a domain traditionally managed by the state. Concurrently, narratives of the German reception system reaching its limits and political calls imploring the state to act highlighted the broader context. Although past experiences have demonstrated the effectiveness of crisis-discourse driven mobilization in engaging volunteers, they have also revealed the risk for ‘sobering’ experiences, including disappointment and fatigue, often due to a lack of recognition and appreciation for volunteers’ efforts (Gerlach 2017; Pries 2019). As civil society steps in to fulfil roles once in the domain of the state, it prompts considerations of the extent to which public responsibilities should rely on and be entrusted to voluntary engagement, leaving civil society as a ‘gap filler’ where the state’s involvement falls short. This is particularly relevant in the context of asylum and refugee support, where the physical and

psychological burdens on volunteers must be carefully considered (Schmid 2021).

With civil society sometimes viewed as underpowered and instrumentalized by the state, and at other times overestimated, with their capabilities exaggerated or even interpreted as a new kind of ‘subversive humanitarianism’, driven by political considerations (Pries 2019, 5–6, 18), it raises an interesting question about how civil society perceives the state and the responsibility it should undertake. At the same time, civil society is not a monolith. In the asylum space, it is perhaps best known for its open arms, but it also includes right-wing movements, xenophobic collective actions, including violent attacks on refugee reception centres (Pries 2019, 5). Furthermore, the political arena is frequently neglected as a relevant component of engagement in support of refugees. Civil society’s diversity is especially pronounced in the realm of refugee support, where involvement manifests in various forms and motivations can vary widely. Our study contributes by examining how these differing motivations relate to the choice of engagement forms within refugee support. On the basis of this differentiation, we distinguish between views on the state, depending on whether individuals’ engagement in civil society is rather social-humanitarian or political. Through this, we aim to comment on the connections among motivation, engagement type and view on state duties.

Using data from a survey on political and social engagement in the field of forced migration ($N = 2000$) and data on host engagement in private accommodation of forced migrants from Ukraine ($N = 4639$), we compare individuals involved in political and social-humanitarian engagement with the case of private accommodation as a distinct form of social-humanitarian engagement. Within the diverse spectrum of engagement types in the field of flight and asylum with different waves of activation over time, this article seeks to investigate the following two questions:

1. How does motivation influence individuals’ choices of engagement type?
2. To what extent does type of engagement influence volunteers’ perspective on the role of the state?

1.1 | Civil Society and Motivations for Volunteering in the A/Political Sphere of Refugee Support

Humanitarian crises have consistently mobilized various segments of civil society (della Porta 2018; Zamponi and Bosi 2018). This was particularly evident in 2015 when civic involvement in support of forced migrants gained broader traction. Over the past decade, engagement in this realm has undergone a significant transformation: What was once considered a niche activity has now become a widespread phenomenon. The increase in the sheer number of volunteers has coincided with an expansion in scale, responsibilities and legitimacy of civil society in Germany and greater influence within the broader migrant reception system, underscoring that it is more than a mere supplement to the traditional role of the state (Becker, Speth, and Graf Strachwitz 2016; Pries 2019; Rea et al. 2019, 25). This surge

in volunteering can be attributed to positive mainstream and social media reactions, especially during the ‘welcome culture’ phase in 2015 (Simsa 2017), and to the inadequacy of existing political response structures, contributing to the perception that the state had lost control over refugee reception (Rea et al. 2019, 29; Pries 2019). In 2015, civil society stepped in to address the shortcomings of European state responses, marked by a logic of ‘organized non-responsibility’ (Pries 2019, 2, 6). Gaps left by states unable or unwilling to ensure refugee protection according to legal and moral standards were filled by civil society acting as a critical link between migrants and states (Pries 2019, 2–3, 6). This commitment was similarly evident in 2022 and aligns with historical patterns of civil society engagement in Germany, such as support for so-called guest workers and their families in 1970s and for asylum seekers from Kosovo in the 1990s (Schmid 2021, 8, 10.11). However, this phenomenon has not necessarily been observed in all European countries. For example, in the Netherlands, engagement levels have remained largely consistent over the last decade, with minimal impact from societal events (Meijeren, Lubbers, and Scheepers 2023).

The engagement during 2015 took place in a time when the narrative shifted from viewing issues as isolated to Africa or the Middle East to recognizing Europe as part of a global context where people are forced to flee their homes in search safety (Pries 2019, 5). Germany’s response to the 2015 refugee wave initially featured a strong humanitarian effort, epitomized by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ‘Wir schaffen das’ (‘We can do this’). However, as refugee numbers grew, concerns over integration, security and resources led to a backlash with right-wing parties arguing that the ‘loss of control’ should never happen again (Pries 2019, 5). Similarly, in the 1990s, initial joy over repatriates from Russia turned into fears of competition for jobs and housing (Schmid 2021, 9). In contrast to 2015, the mass displacement from Ukraine caused by the Russian aggression seems to have been met with more unified and sympathetic responses due to the geopolitical context and proximity, despite tensions over the perceived disparity in the treatment of different refugee groups.

The increase in asylum seekers in 2015 led to a broadening of the spectrum of engaged groups in Germany, extending beyond the traditionally involved radical-left, anti-racist and faith-based groups (Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017, 18). The volunteers who joined during that time had not previously been politically active nor had they volunteered in other areas (Karakayali and Kleist 2016). It follows that this new demographic of volunteers was driven to engage by motivations that extended beyond the religious or political justifications of the original faith-based and left-wing volunteer groups (Karakayali and Kleist 2016).

To analyse these motivations, we utilize a range of established research and validated scales. In particular, we apply the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) (Clary et al. 1998), a common tool for distinguishing and classifying different motivations for volunteering, identifying six distinct motivation categories: **values**, which involve expressing or acting on values such as humanitarianism and helping those less fortunate; **understanding**, which pertains to learning more about the world and exercising often unused skills; **enhancement**, which focuses on psychological growth and development through volunteering; **career**, which

aims at gaining career-related experience; **social**, which allows the individual to strengthen social relationships and **protective**, which involves reducing negative feelings or addressing personal problems. Although the VFI has been widely utilized (Chacón et al. 2017) and covers a diverse set of motivations, it is not entirely comprehensive and lacks nuance in some areas. Literature on volunteers in several contexts has uncovered additional motivations not directly covered by the VFI, including feelings of compassion (Sandri 2018), a sense of moral fulfilment that brings comfort to oneself (Chouliaraki 2013) and identification with refugees based on past experiences (Milan 2018). These motivations come in addition to more nuanced descriptions of already identified motivations. For example, value-based motivations may be pointed towards specific groups distinguishing between *universalism* which refers to actions driven by a broader societal concern (Schwartz et al. 2001) and *benevolence* which addresses actions to improve the lives of specific individuals in need (Verkasalo et al. 2009). Meijeren, Lubbers, and Scheepers (2024) recently summarized the state of the field in a literature review of volunteer motivations and suggested expanding the VFI to include these additional categories to more accurately delineate between volunteers’ motivations.

For the purpose of this article, which examines the distinction between social and political engagement, we concentrate on four categories that we believe best reflect the context of our survey population and serve to highlight the heterogeneous motives that produce distinct actions. We select two from the original VFI—*values* and *enhancement*—and two from Meijeren et al.’s expansion—*universalism* and *benevolence*.

Schmid (2021, 170–182) identifies two ideal-typical groups of volunteers, providing a framework to distinguish between social-humanitarian and political engagement and the motivations mentioned above. The first group—social-humanitarian engagement—is primarily focused on providing optimal living conditions, often forming close, one-on-one relationships with refugees. This type of engagement aligns with benevolence, as it aims to improve the life of the individual supported, and with enhancement, as it seeks to enrich the volunteer’s life through learning and local relationships. Schmid notes that this form of engagement frequently lacks broader organizational support, making mobilization difficult. The second ideal engagement type engages in political advocacy and confrontation, emphasizing beliefs about how support should be implemented and does not involve direct contact with refugees, aligning more with universalism.

Although both groups share a common goal of aiding refugees reflecting their shared values, their strategies for long-term, sustainable support differ. These groups are further influenced differently by political events with respect to how and when they engage. Although top-down political decisions on higher levels and shifting moods on migration in society lead the first group to concentrate on local improvements, the other push for broader asylum policy changes. This results in public negotiations over the overall goals of engagement. Conversely, bottom-up politization of volunteers in refugee support through local events, like deportations, can bridge the divide between the two ideal types of volunteer groups, uniting them in a common cause and aligning them against state policies.

Schmid's proposal of the two ideal-typical groups complements Ekman and Amnå's (2012) proposal to expand traditional political participation categories—such as voting, donating, boycotting, petition signing, political party involvement, protesting and contacting officials—to include 'latent' forms of engagement. These 'pre-political' or 'stand-by' activities, though not directly aimed at those in power, are crucial for future political actions and include civic and social involvement, such as volunteer work assisting others or improving conditions for specific groups, whether individually or collectively (Ekman and Amnå 2012).

Considering the diversity in motivations, as well as types of engagement, and self-reflection on involvement, our interest lies in understanding whether individuals in various engagement forms are driven by distinct motivations. Building on this distinction, we are curious whether individuals' different forms of engagement and consequently varying levels of collaborations with and support from the state affect their perception of the state's role in relation to refugee reception and inclusion differently.

Previous studies in the German context have noted that many volunteers make a deliberate effort to distance themselves from being political (Karayakali and Kleist 2016; Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017, 27). This tendency can be explained by viewing humanitarianism as a benevolent, impartial force in contrast to political activism, which is often inscribed with negative connotations (Nyers 2006, 27, 32). However, drawing from Nyers (2006, 29), we adopt the view that engagement in the field of migration and asylum is inherently political irrespective of its form—a view that aligns with the concept of 'politics of humanitarianism', which highlights the intertwined nature of politics and humanitarianism. Although the 'refugee crisis' of 2015 spurred mobilization and alleviated pressure on governmental actors, refugee solidarity was nonetheless at the same time stripped of its political nature as volunteers distanced themselves from government policies, citing objectivity and neutrality (Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017, 19f). However, in their supposedly politically neutral actions within a highly political sphere of action, volunteers unwittingly reinforced the government's classifications of refugees as either 'desirable' or 'undesirable', thereby inadvertently supporting the existing migration regime (Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017, 19f). Although criticism exists for volunteers not situating their activities within a broader political context due to their perceived 'apoliticalness', many volunteers also undergo a transformation and become explicitly political as a result of their involvement, their learnings about the broader context of the so-called refugee crisis and develop political opinions, for instance, on deportation (della Porta and Steinhilper 2021; Monforte and Maestri 2022; Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017, 20, 22; Pries 2019, 6–7; Sandri 2018; Schmid 2021, 170, 182).

Although our focus also encompasses the division of responsibility between civil society and the state, we acknowledge that there has been a limited exploration into the degree in which civil society—both organizations and non-affiliated individuals—ought to take on state duties. However, without distinguishing between those involved in political activities and social-humanitarian engagement, an analysis comparing individuals engaged in 2014 and 2015 demonstrates that volunteers'

perspectives on responsibility are fairly evenly distributed; less than 10% attribute the responsibility exclusively to either civil society or the state, regardless of the duration of their voluntary work (Karakayali and Kleist 2016). The study concludes that this suggests volunteers are primarily inclined towards collaboration and a shared division of labour with governmental bodies and authorities (Karakayali and Kleist 2016).

Despite civil society's willingness to share responsibility with the state, the relationship remains asymmetrical through the state's ability to steer civil society's involvement through project funding and short project timelines, potentially limiting political discussions (Schmid 2021, 211–212). In 2015, this led to blurred boundaries between state and civil society, with civil society mobilizing rapidly and volunteers sometimes acting as street-level bureaucrats (Schmid 2021, 213). A similar pattern seemed visible in 2022. As media attention diminishes, civil society's role in applying political pressure and highlighting issues can become more pronounced. Schmid theorizes that state influence can politicize engagement, enabling an opposition with a clear addressee for political demands. This dynamic gives civil society a powerful position as both critic and quick mobilizer against government misconduct and amplifying impacts of protests (Schmid 2021, 213–216). However, as crises subside, many revert to previous structures (ibid: 218).

2 | Data and Methods: Two Surveys on Engagement for Refugees

To address our two research questions, we surveyed 5682 volunteers and activists in the field of migration in asylum about their involvement in various activities, their motivations and their perspectives on the state's role in this field. The full dataset consists of two surveys conducted in the winter of 2022–2023 in response to the influx of refugees arriving in Germany and the subsequent rise in engagement for refugees. The first survey—'engagement survey'—concentrated explicitly on the activities and motivations of engaged individuals and was in the field during November and December 2022 ($N = 2000$).¹ The second survey—'host survey'—was conducted in January 2023 and specifically targeted individuals who had volunteered to host refugees in their home ($N = 3682$).

The main variable of interest within our analysis is the 'type of engagement' of each respondent. In the first research question, it acts as our dependent variable, when we examine how different motivations influence the type of engagement. In the second research question, it functions as an independent variable when we examine how different types of engagement affect individuals' perceptions of the role the state should play in migration and asylum issues. To operationalize, our primary variable of interest, 'type of engagement', we categorized each respondent as either being politically engaged or socially engaged based on the activities they reported participating in. We define social-humanitarian engagement to be any individual who works directly with refugees in some capacity. In the host survey, this consists of individuals who were matched with and hosted refugees in their home ($N = 3682$), and in the engagement survey, it includes individuals who participated in shared activities with

the aim of providing inclusion support (e.g., sports and cultural events) or volunteered to provide assistance directly (e.g., aid organization, sponsorship and language assistance) ($N = 1227$). As for politically engaged individuals, we define this group as individuals who *exclusively* participated in political activities, meaning they had no direct contact with refugees in a support function. Examples of political activities that respondents could select include involvement in a political party, attendance at demonstrations, or advocacy through letter writing. Important to note is that although inclusion into political or social-humanitarian engagement is mutually exclusive, individuals classified as social-humanitarian engaged may have also participated in political activities, meaning this group is not necessarily apolitical.

For the survey of hosts, most of our respondents were couples aged 45–60 who lived near an urban area and who had an above-average education compared to the national average. Although, at the household level, the gender distribution among hosts is balanced, survey respondents themselves were predominantly female (59%). In addition, respondents tended to have above-average incomes and 20% owned a home or separate apartment that they were able to rent out. Respondents of the ‘engagement survey’ have a similar socio-demographic profile. They tend to have above-average incomes and be highly educated (70% have the German Abitur or comparable). One difference between the two surveys, however, is the average age. The average age in the engagement survey is 46, a few years younger than the average in the host survey (51), which aligns with the finding that those who are older and who likely have more resources at their disposal are more likely to provide homestay accommodation (Haller et al. 2022). Overall, the combined set of responses is comparable to other studies on refugee engagement in Germany with respect to average age, income and a skew towards female respondents (Simonson et al. 2021; Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2018). In addition, the general demographic profile of volunteers as well as the average household size (2.60) and above-average income are aligning with other samples of humanitarian volunteers across Europe (Feischmidt, Pries and Cantat 2019; Gerö and Sik 2020; Meijeren, Lubbers, and Scheepers 2023).

Looking at the distribution of demographic statistics by type of engagement as seen in Table 1, we can see that there are a few notable differences between the respondents in each engagement group. Those who perform social-humanitarian acts are more likely to have graduated with a high school diploma (*abitur*) and, in turn, are more likely to have income in the top income bracket. Further, the two groups diverge with respect to political party preferences. The green party is dominant between the two groups but those, who are exclusively politically engaged, are less likely to be affiliated with the green party (40% vs. 52%) and have stronger affiliations with the SPD (social democratic party) and die Linke (the left party). With respect to our two variables of interest, motivations and perceptions of the state, we can already see a gap between the two groups. Those engaged politically are more likely to report that they believe the state should take a more active role in migration reception and are motivated much more strongly by a religious duty rather than a democratic duty as compared to the social-humanitarian group.

3 | Findings: Examining Engagement Types, Motivations and Perceptions

3.1 | Universalism Driving the Political, Benevolence Motivating the Social-Humanitarian Engagement

To address our first research question on the link between motivations and type of engagement, we construct a logistic regression to discern the likelihood of an individual’s engagement being either political or social. This model integrates demographic features (age, gender and level of education) alongside the impact of diverse motivations. With respect to the data on respondents’ motivation, respondents were presented with eight distinct motivations and asked to what extent they agreed with the following statements as part of their motivation for engaging in the field of migration and asylum. Their answers were then recorded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

To build our model, we stratified individual’s motivation by age, gender and level of education while regressing onto type of engagement. For our interpretation of the covariates, we aggregated the different statements into four different groups of motivation: enhancement-based motivations (I want to learn about other cultures; I want to improve coexistence), value-based motivations (I believe activism is part of democracy; I believe activism is a religious duty) and motivations either related to universalism (I want to give back because I myself have experienced generosity from others; I want to help shape society) or related to benevolence (I want to help other people; I want to support refugees). The model is an accurate estimator of the data, posing a Brier score of 0.041, and is a strong out of sample predictor with a leave-one out cross-validation prediction error of 0.042. Further given that number of respondents in the engagement type variable is fairly unbalanced,² we calculated a receiver operating characteristic curve to test the model’s performance at a range of different classification thresholds and measured the area under the curve (AUC) to be 0.974 indicating a good measure of separability. To simplify the interpretation, we standardized each of the predictors so the value of the coefficient represents one standardization change from its mean, whereas remaining predictors are held constant.

In general, motivators were much stronger predictors of type of engagement compared to demographic factors. Looking at mean estimates for the model’s coefficients along with the standard errors in Figure 1, we observe that the value-based motivations (i.e. democracy and religion) had the largest impact on the likelihood of political engagement, but in opposing directions. That is, individuals, who viewed engagement as a core part of democracy, were more likely to be socially engaged, whereas those motivated by religious beliefs (as a primary motivator) were more likely to exclusively engage in political activities. Motivations that related to universalism (give back and help society) versus to benevolence (help others and help refugees) were also relatively strong predictors of engagement. The direction of their effect of societal and individual motivators is internally consistent, meaning those primarily motivated by universalism were more likely to be politically engaged compared to benevolence motivated persons

TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of political and socio-demographic variables.

Variable	Political engagement N = 1227		Social-humanitarian engagement N = 3682	
	Average	SD	Average	SD
Age	47.2	14.8	49.4	13.2
Gender				
Female	49%		58%	
Male	52%		42%	
Monthly income (€)				
0–999	11%		3%	
–2000	18%		11%	
–3000	19%		20%	
–4000	20%		21%	
–5000	17%		18%	
5000+	15%		27%	
Household size	2.33	1.16	2.65	1.37
Education				
Vocational (Hauptschule)	5%		3%	
Technical trade (Realschul)	23%		16%	
Highschool (Abitur)	61%		67%	
Advanced degree	11%		13%	
Political party				
AfD	3%		2%	
Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU)/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU)	11%		14%	
Die Grünen	40%		52%	
Die Linke	16%		8%	
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	5%		5%	
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	20%		14%	
Other	7%		5%	
Perception of state responsibility (0 = full state responsibility)	32.1	16.6	66.5	24.6
Motivation (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)				
Learn about other cultures	4.2	1.0	3.7	1.1
Improve coexistence	4.21	0.8	3.7	1.2
Activism is part of democracy	2.1	1.3	4.4	0.9
Activism is a religious duty	3.7	1.0	2.1	1.4
Have experienced generosity	4.44	0.7	3.1	1.3
Help shape society	4.3	0.8	4.3	0.9
Help others	3.1	1.2	4.71	0.6
Support refugees	4.0	0.9	4.4	0.8

Abbreviations: AfD, *Alternative für Deutschland*; SPD, social democratic party.




FIGURE 1 | Mean coefficient values for logistic regression on the effect of motivations on type of engagement.

who were more likely to be in social-humanitarian activities. The enhancement-based motivations (learn something and improve coexistence) in comparison to motivations based on values, universalism and benevolence were not as strong predictors.

To more accurately estimate the effect of the value-based motivations given the large number of predictors in our model with varying distributions, we computed the population-average predictive difference by varying the value-based motivations while averaging over the distribution of the remaining coefficients. For individuals who strongly agree that engagement is at the core of democracy (high democratic motivations), 41% are less likely to engage politically compared to those not motivated by activism as part of democracy. In contrast, individuals with high religious motivation were 16% more likely than individuals with non-religious motivation with all other factors held constant to engage politically.

Considering the notable motivations behind social-humanitarian or political engagement, our enduring interest lies in examining how these factors influence individuals' perspectives on the broader responsibilities shouldered by either the state or civil society.

3.2 | The Politically Engaged Want More State Responsibility in Refugee Reception and Support

To estimate the effect of engagement on the perception of the state's role in migration and asylum issues, we regress individuals' assessment of the role of the state on demographic factors (age, gender and level of education) and the nature of one's engagement (strictly political vs. social-humanitarian). We also include the political party of the respondent as a factor within our regression as it is likely to capture some variation with respect to individuals' opinions of the role of the state as it relates to migration and asylum. For our dependent variable, assessment of the role of the state, respondents indicated on a

scale of 0–100 the percentage they believed should be done by either engaged individuals or the state with 100 representing total responsibility of individuals and 0 being full state responsibility. Between the two surveys we deployed, there was a discrepancy in how the independent variable was measured; in the 'hosts survey' preference is captured as a Likert variable, whereas in the 'engagement survey', preference is recorded as a continuous variable on sliding interval of ± 5 . To maintain comparability, we impute the mean value of the category for the 'hosts survey'. By converting responses from a discrete to a continuous scale, we have, however, introduced additional precision into our data that was not originally recorded. Given the discrepancy of how the data were collected between the two surveys, we unfortunately cannot eliminate this bias, but when recalculating our estimates instead of converting the responses from a continuous to a discrete scale, we identified which estimates were robust to this change (see Appendix 3 for more information). Looking at the resulting coefficients in Figure 2, whether someone engages exclusively politically was the strongest predictor in their belief of whether the state or individuals should assume more responsibility for affairs related to migration and asylum, with those who engage politically preferring the state to assume more responsibility. With respect to political parties, the reference category is AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*)³ supporters, meaning that in comparison supporters of all other parties support more involvement from individuals on migration and asylum services, whereas AfD supporters prefer more state involvement. However, the signs of the effects of one's political party were not robust when we applied the restricted dataset or when the regression was run with categories instead of the imputation of mean values (see Section 3.3).

3.3 | Robustness Checks

Because our sample of socially engaged persons was composed of data from two different populations (i.e. the socially engaged from the engagement survey and individuals who offered homestay




FIGURE 2 | Coefficient values from linear regression of type of engagement on role of the state. Positive = individual responsibility and negative = state responsibility. SPD, social democratic party.

accommodation from the host survey), we recomputed the analysis for effect of motivation on type of engagement, excluding those who offered homestay accommodation to see whether our findings were sensitive to their inclusion. The rationale for this check is that although those who offer homestay accommodation and individuals who engage socially by working with refugees directly in other ways (e.g., bureaucratic support and language assistance) both fall under our definition of ‘social engagement’, providing private housing to refugees can be assumed to require more resources and time compared to other types for social engagement and enters the private sphere to a different degree and therefore could be guided by different motivations. In addition, because those who offer homestay accommodation (‘hosts’) constitute three quarters of those that are socially engaged within our dataset, we wanted to see if our results on the effect of motivation and engagement type were representative of social engagement generally or if they were merely overshadowed by the motivations of the hosts in our sample.

Looking at Figure 3 which compares the full sample to that without hosts included, all effects are nearly identical. The value-based motivations are still two of the strongest predictors of type of engagement.

We performed the same robustness check on our second research question, the effect of engagement on respondents’ perception of the role of the state. The rationale here is similar, and those, who offered homestay accommodation, were more likely to have direct contact with the state given their involvement in the reception process (Author et al. 2022). Looking at Figure 4, the coefficients of the linear model with and without the hosts, their inclusion seems to bias the overall results as the magnitude and sign of some of our results are sensitive to their inclusion. Although the type of engagement is still the strongest predictor of a respondent’s view of the state, the magnitude of the effect has decreased significantly. Similarly, the effect of political parties was not robust to this change, and all coefficients changed signs switching

and now a positive change political party (stronger support) is associated with increased desire for the state to play a larger role. From this, it can be inferred that the hosts were driving the strong preference for increased responsibility by individuals. This preference is indicative of selection bias. Individuals who believe that private citizens should take a larger role in refugee support compared to the state are more inclined to offer private accommodation themselves. Although there is still a relationship between engagement type and preference, it appears as if the magnitude of the relationship is highly contingent on the types of activities being measured.

4 | Discussion: A Vocal Faction on Enhanced State Responsibility

In response to the literature suggesting that many volunteers view themselves as operating outside the spheres of politics, this study compares volunteers engaged in traditional political activities with those involved in social-humanitarian engagement. After the influx of asylum seekers in 2015, local communities played a vital role by providing essential provisional assistance, significantly aiding the state, but also assuming some roles that typically fell within the state’s responsibilities. This effort was driven by many volunteers motivated by a desire to address gaps within community structures (Karakayali and Kleist 2016). A motivation that remains interesting and yet to be fully explored. Our analysis on the basis of data collected during 2022–2023 suggests that value-based motivations such as democratic ideals and religious beliefs significantly influenced political and social engagement in opposite ways. Those motivated by activism as a core part of democracy were more inclined towards social engagement, whereas religiously motivated individuals were more prone to political engagement, suggesting that motivations significantly influence the nature of engagement for those who support refugees. Analytically distinguishing between types of engagement thereby reveals novel insights into the motivation for




FIGURE 3 | Comparison of coefficient values from logistic regression on the effect of motivations on type of engagement (full sample vs. sample without hosts).




FIGURE 4 | Comparison of coefficient values from linear regression on effect of engagement type on view on role of the state (full sample vs. without hosts). SPD, social democratic party.

distinct forms of engagement. Motivations rooted in universalism drive political involvement, whereas those based on benevolence propel engagement in social-humanitarian efforts. This distinction highlights the difference between those who focus on broader systemic issues and those who are more attuned to immediate, on-the-ground needs within state responses and structures.

Interestingly, despite the sobering effect observed among volunteers following the 2015 experience, there was a renewed surge of civil society engagement in 2022 during the influx of forced migrants from Ukraine. However, this resurgence might indicate a repetition of problematic strategies in the state response, similar to those observed in 2015. Instead of rectifying deficiencies in the state's response post-2015, the state emphasized the expansion of volunteer structures (Jöris 2016). This approach faced criticism

that the state's interpretation of volunteer involvement led to an assumption that tasks could be completed effortlessly, allowing the state to evade its conceptual and financial responsibilities (Graf 2017). In 2022, the state once again heavily relied on private citizens opening their doors and contributing to the reception and inclusion of refugees. Our findings imply that many individuals, particularly those who accommodated refugees in their private homes, do not perceive the extent of responsibility assumed by civil society compared to the state, as a critical issue. Schmid's analysis sheds some light on this phenomenon, as it revealed that many volunteers engaged in one-on-one relationships with refugees often operated as lone wolves, without organizational affiliation (Schmid 2021, 171–172), which could in turn lead to a diminished awareness of the broader political context of refugee assistance and state responsibilities. In our

analysis, those engaged in this type of work were driven primarily by benevolence, focusing on supporting individuals. As crisis discourses recede, volunteers have historically withdrawn and supporting infrastructure has reverted to its prior state (Schmid 2021, 218). However, those offering homestays for refugees might have found it more challenging to disengage and may have felt abandoned by the state. Our survey offers some indication after the crisis discourse had been receding, as it was conducted early 2023, a year after the invasion of Ukraine and the peak of arrivals in March 2022. Yet, it remains important to examine whether volunteers engaged in this distinct form of social-humanitarian work within the private sphere continued to feel positive about carrying this responsibility or if their attitudes have shifted over time. Additionally, it is important for further research on the topic to investigate whether these volunteers, who were significantly more supportive of individual efforts over state efforts, are at higher risk of experiencing burnout, especially if they do not view dropping out as a viable option and if the temporariness of homestay accommodation extends beyond their initial expectations.

While the portrayal of the 'refugee crisis' in 2015 had mobilizing effects and provided relief for governmental actors, it also ensured the continuity of the migration regime (Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017, 20). Although volunteers disassociated their work from government policies, attributing impartiality and neutrality, their actions coincided with a significant tightening of German asylum laws (Pro Asyl 2016). Meanwhile, challenges like de-professionalization and the privatization of social work surrounding asylum seekers create a significant concern: The increasing perception of asylum as a mere act of humanitarianism rather than an individually guaranteed right by the state (Graf 2017). When volunteers uncritically adopt the government distinctions between 'desirable' and 'undesirable' refugees, they inadvertently support the existing migration regime and contribute to preserving a flawed system amidst inadequate migration and asylum policies (Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017, 21, 24). Although the response to the Ukrainian refugee influx triggered the activation of temporary protection (however, only for individuals who had resided in Ukraine), subsequently, legislative changes threatening asylum seekers with border procedures under detention conditions, deportations to unfamiliar countries and stricter application of the Dublin system have been initiated (Pro Asyl 2023). Despite significant criticism from numerous human rights organizations and lawyers, who have called it the most significant tightening of refugee laws in decades (Pro Asyl 2023), the reform of the Common Asylum System was agreed upon by the EU states (Bundesregierung 2023) in October 2023. This suggests the effectiveness of the hesitant expansion of reception structures and the problematization of refugee arrivals as a deliberate demonstration of state overload aimed at deterrence (van Dyk and Misbach 2016, 215; Graf 2017).

One explanation is the neo liberalization of the welfare state, which differentiates 'deserving' and from 'undeserving' residents. A strong welfare state provides more benefits to its citizens but simultaneously makes it harder for non-citizens to access resources from the state due to strict regulations and a less established third sector (Bendixsen and Eriksen 2024, 2749). Welfare rights have thus become a technique to manage migration, by

creating hierarchies of deservingness and exclusion (Bendixsen and Eriksen 2024, 2749). In this context, the Temporary Protection Directive is significant, because it granted more rights and services for Ukrainian refugees, both through state mechanisms and state-funded civil society projects targeting Ukrainian refugees. This facilitated, among other things, private accommodation for refugees without uncertainties about the legal framework, setting it apart from the circumstances surrounding engagement for refugees in Germany during the arrival of refugees in 2015 and 2016. Recent legal proceedings in Europe against individuals aiding migrants during that period, termed 'crimes of solidarity', underscore the contentious and political nature of engagement in the field (Tazzioli and Walters 2019). However, the temporary protection directive introduced significantly different circumstances for Ukrainian refugees and volunteers by also eliminating the criminalization of actions like driving refugees across EU borders, which could otherwise have been deemed illegal.

In our analysis, exclusive political engagement was the strongest predictor of one's views on the distribution of responsibility between the state and individuals in migration and asylum affairs. Karakayali and Kleist's (2016) findings suggest volunteers prefer a balanced responsibility for asylum-related tasks, with a majority advocating for an equal share between the state and civil society. However, our analysis reveals that politically engaged individuals are more critical of civil society's responsibilities, advocating for a heavier burden on the state in refugee support. According to Fleischmann and Steinhilper (2017, 21, 24), when volunteers recognize the inherent political nature of their work, they have the potential to reshape societal structures and address problematic aspects. The socially engaged individuals in our sample are, however, more open to shouldering the load. Moreover, the subgroup of respondents hosting refugees in their own homes were inclined towards the belief that the individuals should take on a more significant role in these matters in comparison to the other socially humanitarian engaged. In contrast to our findings, Merikoski (2021) suggests that by hosting asylum seekers, citizens challenge current migration policies and discourse, reflecting an opposition to unjust practices. However, based on interviews from 2017 to 2019 before, the arrival of refugees from Ukraine and the activation of the temporary protection directive. Merikoski (2021) further argues that although citizens contest border closures and unfair decisions, they also exercise power in choosing whom to support and under what conditions, thus potentially differentiating between 'desired' and 'undesired' refugees. Individuals in our data may not have been as aware of the distinction between refugees with different recognized protection statuses, especially because this aspect was briefly removed from the debate for the largest refugee group of 2022 due to the activation of the temporary protection directive. The political reflection on topics such as deportation might not have been present for the hosts in our data, and instead of being viewed as 'migrants' or 'refugees', people coming from Ukraine might have been seen as 'European citizens' (Amelina 2022, 7). The distinctive view carried by those engaged in homestay could further have been influenced by the nature of their engagement. This practice involves (most often) citizens lacking prior connections with the refugees they host, extending private hospitality into the public sphere rooted in humanitarian and solidarity movements, and in many cases creating feelings of responsibility and a bond between host and those hosted (Bassoli and Luccioni 2023, 5).

5 | Conclusion

This article delved into the motivations that inspire engagement and the diverse forms of engagement, all within the shared social-political context of Germany. It drew on survey data collected in 2022 and 2023, initiated in response to the influx of refugees from Ukraine.

By adopting a comprehensive approach to refugee support, which encompasses activities spanning from political advocacy for refugees to integrative initiatives like offering language courses, our sample enabled the recognition of various categories of civic engagement for refugees. This approach added depth to our analysis and enabled us to compare individuals who engage in political or social-humanitarian engagement, including homestay accommodation.

We found that individuals exclusively engaged in political activities were more motivated by universalism and advocated for increased state responsibility. This view contrasted with the perceptions held by socially engaged individuals, who leaned towards civil society assuming more responsibility for affairs related to migration and asylum and were more motivated by benevolence. Conversely, those involved in homestay accommodation leaned even further towards the belief that civil society should bear the primary responsibility in the realm of asylum. Further research is needed to explore the consequences of varying levels of state involvement on both engaged individuals and refugees. Specifically, it would be valuable to examine how increased or decreased state support impacts volunteer burnout and dropout rates, as well as the experiences of refugees. This would further the field of study, as states, local politics and administrations have formal obligations to support asylum seekers, whereas individuals in civil society often act out of moral, social and personal commitments. Reflecting on our findings in a broader context, our analysis suggested that recognizing the political underpinning of engagement is crucial to avoid perpetuating the state's restrictive migration policies and their political agendas.

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge the contributions of Sabrina Zajak, Elias Steinhilper, Zeynep Yanasmayan and Ramona Rischke who have been part of a larger research team examining homestay accommodation of refugees and engagement in the field of asylum and refuge. This publication is based upon work from COST Action "Transnational Family Dynamics in Europe, CA21143", supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology).

Open access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in Comparative Engagement: Political versus Socio-humanitarian at <https://zenodo.org/records/13143527>.

Endnotes

¹ Both surveys utilized the Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) technique. The 'engagement survey' was administered by a survey institute, which recruits members of its in-house panel through various online sources and channels. To address any online bias, approximately 50% of panelists were additionally recruited via telephone.

² Overall, 86% social engagement versus 14% political engagement.

³ Alternative for Germany is a right-wing populist political party in Germany. AfD is known for its Euroscepticism, as well as for opposing immigration to Germany.

References

- Amelina, A. 2022. "Knowledge Production for Whom? Doing Migrations, Colonialities and Standpoints in Non-Hegemonic Migration Research." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 45, no. 13: 2393–2415. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2022.2064717>.
- Bassoli, M., and C. Luccioni. 2023. "Homestay Accommodation for Refugees (in Europe). A Literature Review." *International Migration Review* 58, no. 3: 1532–1567. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183231172101>.
- Becker, E., R. Speth, and R. Graf Strachwitz. 2016. "Zivilgesellschaft Als Lotsen in die Gesellschaft." *Observatorium. Analysen, Positionen Und Diskurse Zu Zivilgesellschaft, Engagement Und Philanthropie* 8, no. 4: 1–6.
- Bendixsen, S., and T. H. Eriksen. 2024. "The Neoliberal Welfare State and Its Discontents. Slow Violence Against Irregular Migrants in Norway." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 50, no. 11: 2747–2766. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2023.2298544>.
- Bundesregierung [The Federal Government (Germany)]. 2023. *Council Agrees on EU Asylum Reform: Federal Government*. Berlin: Bundesregierung. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/eu-asylum-reform-2195634>.
- Carlsen, H. B., T. Gårdhus, and J. Toubøl. 2023. "Ukrainian Refugee Solidarity Mobilization Online." *European Societies* 26: 374–385. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2177704>.
- Chacón, F., G. Gutiérrez, V. Sauto, M. L. Vecina, and A. Pérez. 2017. "Volunteer Functions Inventory: A Systematic Review." *Psicothema* 29: 306–316.
- Chouliaraki, L. 2013. *The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Clary, E. G., M. Snyder, R. D. Ridge, et al. 1998. "Understanding and Assessing the Motivations of Volunteers: A Functional Approach." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74, no. 6: 1516–1530. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1516>.
- della Porta, D. 2018. *Solidarity Mobilizations in the 'Refugee Crisis'*. London/New York: Macmillan Publishers Limited.
- della Porta, D., and E. Steinhilper. 2021. "Solidarities in Motion: Hybridity and Change in Migrant Support Practices." *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 2: 175–185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920520952143>.
- Ekman, J., and E. Amnå. 2012. "Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a New Typology." *Human Affairs* 22, no. 3: 283–300. <https://doi.org/10.2478/s13374-012-0024-1>.
- Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 2023. *1.1 Million Arrivals of People From Ukraine in 2022*. Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office of Germany. https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2023/02/PE23_N010_12411.html.
- Feischmidt, M., L. Pries, and C. Cantat, eds. 2019. *Refugee Protection and Civil Society in Europe*. New York: Springer International Publishing.
- Fleischmann, L., and E. Steinhilper. 2017. "The Myth of Apolitical Volunteering for Refugees: German Welcome Culture and a New Dispositif of Helping." *Social Inclusion* 5, no. 3: 17–27. <https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v5i3.945>.
- Gerlach, J. 2017. *Hilfsbereite Partner: Muslimische Gemeinden und ihr Engagement für Geflüchtete*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

- Gerö, M., and E. Sik. 2020. "The Moral Panic Button. Construction and consequences." In *Europe and the Refugee Response, a Crisis of Values?*, edited by E. M. Goździak, I. Main, and B. Suter, 39–58. Oxfordshire: Routledge.
- Graf, L. 2017. *Asyl, Eine Frage der Kultur? Die Ambivalente Rolle Zivilgesellschaftlichen Engagements im Deutschen Asylregime*. Soziale Bewegungen, 30. Jg. 3.
- Haller, L., T. Uhr, S. E. Frederiksen, R. Rischke, Z. Yanaşmayan, and S. Zajak. 2022. *New Platforms for Engagement Untertitel: Private Accommodation of Forced Migrants From Ukraine*. Berlin: Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung.
- Harder, N., L. Figueroa, R. Gillum, J. Hainmueller, D. Hangartner, and D. D. Laitin. 2018. "Multidimensional Measure of Immigrant Integration." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 115, no. 45: 11483–11488. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1808793115>.
- Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach. 2018. *Engagement in Der Flüchtlingshilfe. Ergebnisbericht Einer Untersuchung des Instituts Für Demoskopie Allensbach*. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend.
- Jöris, L. 2016. "Zum Unkritischen Umgang mit Ehrenamtlicher Sprachmittlung." *Migazin—Migration*. <http://www.migazin.de/2016/01/18/uebersetz-mal-schnell-ehrenamtliche-sprachmittlung-dolmetscher/>.
- Karakayali, S., and O. Kleist. 2016. *EFA-Studie 2. Strukturen und Motive der Ehrenamtlichen Flüchtlingsarbeit (EFA) in Deutschland*. Berlin: Berliner Institut Für Empirische Integrations- und Migrationsforschung.
- Landmann, H., B. Siem, B. Fuchs, and A. Rohmann. 2023. "Key Experiences of Volunteers in Refugee Aid." *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2023.2238635>.
- Mayer, S. J., A. Lietz, J. Dollmann, M. Siegel, and J. Köhler. 2022. *Reaktionen auf den Ukraine-Krieg. Eine Schnellbefragung des DeZIM.panels (DeZIM.insights Working Paper 1)*. Berlin: Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (DeZIM).
- Mediendienst Integration. 2023. *Flüchtlinge aus Der Ukraine*. Berlin: Mediendienst Integration. <https://mediendienst-integration.de/migration/flucht-asyl/ukrainische-fluechtlinge.html>.
- Meijeren, M., M. Lubbers, and P. Scheepers. 2023. "Trends in Forms of Civic Involvement in the Netherlands Between 2008 and 2020." *Journal of Civil Society* 19, no. 4: 464–484. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2023.2255695>.
- Meijeren, M., M. Lubbers, and P. Scheepers. 2024. "Assessing the 'Why' in Volunteering for Refugees: Exploring Volunteer Motivations." *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 35: 129–129. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-023-00574-y>.
- Merikoski, P. 2021. "'At Least They Are Welcome in My Home!'. Contentious Hospitality in Home Accommodation of Asylum Seekers in Finland." *Citizenship Studies* 25, no. 1: 90–105. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2020.1769558>.
- Milan, C. 2018. "Emotions That Mobilise: The Emotional Basis of Pro-Asylum Seeker Activism in Austria." In *Solidarity Mobilizations in the 'Refugee Crisis': Contentious Moves*, edited by D. Della Porta, 183–208. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Monforte, P., and G. Maestri. 2022. "Between Charity and Protest. The Politicization of Refugee Support Volunteers." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 36: 1–19.
- Nyers, P. 2006. *Rethinking Refugees. Beyond States of Emergency*. London: Routledge.
- Pries, L. 2019. "Introduction: Civil Society and Volunteering in the So-Called Refugee Crisis of 2015—Ambiguities and Structural Tensions." In *Refugee Protection and Civil Society in Europe*, edited by M. Feischmidt, L. Pries, and C. Cantat, 1–23. London: Palgrave Macmillan Cham.
- Pro Asyl. 2016. *Asylpaket II in Kraft: Überblick Über die Geltenden Asylrechtlichen Änderungen*. Frankfurt am Main: Pro Asyl e.V.
- Pro Asyl. 2023. *FAQ Zur Geplanten Reform des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS)*. Frankfurt am Main: Pro Asyl e.V. <https://www.proasyl.de/news/faq-zur-geplanten-reform-des-gemeinsamen-europaeischen-asylsystems-geas/>.
- Rea, A., M. Martiniello, A. Mazzola, and B. Meuleman. 2019. "Introduction. The Refugee Reception Crisis in Europe. Polarized Opinions and Mobilizations." In *The Refugee Reception Crisis. Polarized Opinions and Mobilizations*, edited by A. Rea, M. Martiniello, A. Mazzola, and B. Meuleman, 11–30. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Sandri, E. 2018. "'Volunteer Humanitarianism': Volunteers and Humanitarian Aid in the Jungle Refugee Camp of Calais." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 1: 65–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1352467>.
- Schmid, V. 2021. *Dynamiken Lokaler Flüchtlingshilfe Engagement im Spannungsfeld von Staat und Zivilgesellschaft*. New York: Springer VS.
- Schmid, V., A. Evers, and G. Mildnerberger. 2019. "More or Less Political: Findings on a Central Feature of Local Engagement for Refugees in Germany." *Social Inclusion* 7, no. 2: 165–175. <https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v7i2.1939>.
- Schwartz, S. H., G. Melech, A. Lehmann, S. Burgess, M. Harris, and V. Owens. 2001. "Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values With a Different Method of Measurement." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 32, no. 5: 519–542. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032005001>.
- Simonson, J., N. Kelle, C. Kausmann, and C. Tesch-Römer, eds. 2021. *Freiwilliges Engagement in Deutschland. Der Deutsche Freiwilligensurvey 2019*. Berlin: Deutsches Zentrum für Altersfragen.
- Simsa, R. 2017. "Leaving Emergency Management in the Refugee Crisis to Civil Society? The Case of Austria." *Journal of Applied Security Research* 12, no. 1: 78–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2017.1228026>.
- Tazzioli, M., and W. Walters. 2019. "Migration, Solidarity, and the Limits of Europe." *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs* 9, no. 1: 175–190. <https://doi.org/10.1332/204378918X15453934506030>.
- van Dyk, S., and E. Misbach. 2016. "Zur Politischen Ökonomie des Helfens: Flüchtlingspolitik und Engagement im Flexiblen Kapitalismus." *Prokla. Zeitschrift für Kritische Sozialwissenschaft* 46, no. 183: 205–227. <https://doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v46i183.109>.
- Verkasalo, M., J. E. Lönnqvist, J. O. Lipsanen, and K. Helkama. 2009. "European Norms and Equations for a Two Dimensional Presentation of Values as Measured With Schwartz's 21-Item Portrait Values Questionnaire." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 39: 780–792. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.580>.
- Weisser, R. A. 2022. "A Near-Real-Time Analysis of Societal Responses to Ukrainian Refugee Migration in Europe." *International Migration* 61, no. 4: 17–36. <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13071>.
- Zamponi, L., and L. Bosi. 2018. "Politicizing Solidarity in Times of Crisis: The Politics of Alternative Action Organizations in Greece, Italy and Spain." *American Behavioral Scientist* 63, no. 2: 796–815. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218768861>.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section.